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THE FALL AND RISE OF BLAME
IN AMERICAN TORT LAW*
Anthony J. Sebok'
It is a truism that tort law changed in character
sometime in the middle of the twentieth century. At some
point-maybe 1950, maybe 1960-tort experienced, in the
words of two recent commentators, "a plaintiff-oriented
expansion."' Virtually all commentators, regardless of their
particular normative views, agree that, as a matter of empirical
fact, courts and legislatures changed tort doctrine in ways that
made it easier for injured persons to recover. In a path-
breaking 1985 article titled The Invention of Enterprise
Liability, George Priest announced that "since 1960, our
modern civil liability regime has experienced a conceptual
revolution that is among the most dramatic ever witnessed in
the Anglo-American legal system."2 In 1992, Gary Schwartz
criticized Priest's analysis of the post-1960 revolution, but
agreed that since 1960 the courts instituted a series of
"liability-expanding changes in tort doctrine.'
3
One might think from this description that tort law
experienced a Kuhnian revolution that shocked its
practitioners from one paradigm into another. Thomas Koenig
and Michael Rustad gave this impression in their recent book,
In Defense of Tort Law, in which they state that "the American
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law of torts was a relatively sleepy outpost prior to the 1940's."4
But this statement is true only if one interprets "the law of
torts" to mean tort law's doctrines as accepted by the courts
and laid out in the treatises. During the 1920s and 1930s, the
legal realists set out the theoretical framework for the
revolution that would erupt in the 1960s.
As G. Edward White has noted, realism changed tort
law in two ways.' First, by attacking nineteenth century
conceptualism, scholars such as Leon Green undermined the
foundations upon which traditionalists like Francis Bohlen
based assertions concerning the existence of concepts like
proximate cause, duty and assumption of risk. Green was the
ultimate nominalist; his casebook did not have index entries for
doctrinal categories like assumption of risk. Instead, he
categorized tort cases by context: "automobile traffic" or
"manufacturers and dealers."6
Green's point was not only that students would become
better lawyers if they learned about the patterns of legal
decision making, he was also genuinely skeptical about the
theoretical assumptions that lay behind conventional tort
categories. For example, Green thought that both Justice
Cardozo and Justice Andrews made a mess of the famous
Palsgraf decision.7 According to Green, Cardozo's abstract
discussion of duty and Andrews's hypotheticals concerning
proximate cause simply threw the case into a useless "realm of
metaphysics."8 Similarly, on the eve of America's entry into the
Second World War, William Prosser rejected the idea that
proximate cause could be reduced to "absolute rules" and
denounced the "fruitless quest for a universal formula" of
causation.9
The second way in which legal realism changed tort law
is that it gave judges a new rationale for decision. Green
believed that what both Cardozo and Andrews were concealing
in their conceptualist rhetoric was that Palsgraf was really a
very simple case involving the "adjustment by government of
4 KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 46.
In Tort Law in America, White described the impact of realism (which he
locates as occurring between 1910 and 1945) as foundational. See G. EDWARD WHITE,
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 112 (1985).
LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES (1931).
7 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
8 Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 791 (1930).
9 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 319-20 (1941).
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risks which .. .cannot be eliminated from the hurly-burly of
modern traffic and transportation." 0 Realism in torts meant
that concepts like negligence and causation had to be replaced
with interest balancing between parties to a suit, based on the
specific context of the accident."
One might think that the rejection of conceptualism
would have committed the realists to a form of legal skepticism
or at least agnosticism about how to decide individual tort
cases.'" In fact, Green's radical nominalism, in a way, implied
that every case was sui generis and that nothing scientific
could be said about cases other than a report of their facts. 3
However, realists like Harry Shulman found just the opposite.
In a review of Green's casebook, Shulman noted that an
implication of Green's radical organization was that
"[i]ndividual cases should be studied not merely as particular
private disputes, but as instances of larger social problems." 4
In the casebook Shulman published with Fleming James ten
years later, he boasted openly that the book was designed to
teach students to view tort law as an instrument of "social
engineering."" This was consistent with the view of realists in
other parts of law who saw the "agencies of government,
including courts, as social engineers who balanced the claims of
competing interests on behalf of the public good." 6
Where the conventional histories of tort law are correct
is that, as a matter of doctrine, tort law did not really exhibit
pro-plaintiff tendencies until about 1960. The litany of changes
are well known. Courts and legislatures abolished immunities
for charities, governments and family members. 7  They
'0 Green, supra note 8, at 791.
1' See WHITE, supra note 5, at 107.
12 See, e.g., Harold R. McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes, An
Analysis, 36 A.B.A. J. 261 (1950); Morris R. Cohen, Positivism and the Limits of
Idealism in the Law, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 238 (1927).
13 See Fowler Harper, Book Review, 25 IOWA L. REV. 182 (1939); Fleming
James, Book Review, 28 GEO. L.J. 1146 (1940) (reviewing the second edition of Green's
casebook).
14 Harry Shulman, Book Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1448 (1932).
5 HARRY SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS vii, viii (1942).
16 WHITE, supra note 5, at 106.
17 For charities, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 895E (1965); Colby
v. Carney Hospital, 254 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1969); Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470
S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.9 (2003). For governments, see, e.g.,
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895C.
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eliminated auto-guest statutes and guest doctrines." Tort law
dissolved the special rules of liability for landowners,
sometimes even with regard to trespassers. 9 In medical
malpractice, the elimination of the locality rule and the
emergence of patient-oriented informed consent made it easier
for plaintiffs to overcome physician defenses.20  Courts
recognized new affirmative duties on the part of building
owners, therapists and others to prevent injuries to third
parties.21 Bars and liquor stores acquired the obligation to
prevent injuries caused by drunk driving, as did, on occasion,
social hosts.22 The expansion and codification of manufacturers'
obligations to consumers, which existed since the early part of
the twentieth century, catalyzed the emerging doctrine of strict
products liability.22 The emergence of negligent infliction of
emotional distress under the bystander rule and intentional
infliction of emotional distress created entirely new forms of
civil wrong.24 Comparative fault replaced the defense of
contributory negligence, and many courts merged the defense
of assumption of risk into comparative fault.2' Courts and
legislatures relaxed the rules of causation as well, first with
the introduction of alternative liability, then with the
expansion of the substantial factor test through the
introduction of concepts like market-share liability and loss of
chance.26 As Gary Schwartz famously commented, until the
early 1980s, the modern cases added to casebooks were "almost
18 For auto-guest statutes, see, e.g., McConville v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962); Zumwalt v. Limland, 396 P.2d
205 (Or. 1964); Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973).
" See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Peterson v.
Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972).
20 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (1994); Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d
555 (D.C. 1979); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
2 Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 337.
22 For social hosts, see, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984);
Hickbotham v. Burke, 662 A.2d 297 (N.H. 1995). For sales of alcohol, see, e.g.,
Stachiniewitz v. Mar-Com Corp., 499 P.2d 436 (Or. 1971); Ontireros v. Borak, 667 P.2d
200 (Ariz. 1983).
23 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963);
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d (Mich. 1984).
24 For negligent infliction of emotional distress, see, e.g., Dale v. LaCroix, 179
N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1970). For intentional infliction of emotional distress, see, e.g., State
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
25 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balantine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1952).
26 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Co-op of Puget Sound, 666 P.2d 474
(Wash. 1983); Summer v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d
924 (Cal. 1980).
1034 [Vol. 68: 4
2003] THE FALL AND RISE OF BLAME IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 1035
all triumphs for the plaintiffs; the collection of these cases
could be referred to as 'plaintiffs' greatest hits."'27
One popular explanation for the rise of the plaintiff in
the 1960s is that the shift of the balance of power away from
defendants and toward victims was an extension of the basic
concept of negligence that had developed in American law in
the nineteenth century. This argument explains the change in
the doctrines, not as a change in the conceptual premises of
American tort law, but as an example of the law "working itself
pure."28 Thus, for Schwartz, post-1960 tort doctrine was a
consequence of judges taking negligence seriously and creating
a "full regime of negligence liability."29 His explanation for why
this evolution occurred when it did is quite subtle, making the
very reasonable point that it was no accident that judicial
activism in tort law coincided with judicial activism in other
areas of the law, especially civil rights." Under this theory, the
elimination of arbitrary limitations on liability simply gave
more Americans the right to the same redress for injury caused
by faulty behavior that other Americans (namely the rich,
white or powerful) had enjoyed since the time of Holmes.
Others have viewed the doctrinal change more critically.
George Priest, for example, attributed the change to a
revolution in tort theory. According to Priest, erosion of the
traditional concepts of negligence gave way to an ideology of
enterprise liability.3' Enterprise liability is a normative claim:
It states that the right system of tort law is one which spreads
the costs of accidents as broadly as possible by imposing such
costs on those actors who are in the best position to charge
those costs to the parties best able to bear those costs.
Enterprise liability is therefore grounded in a descriptive
claim: It assumes that society will be better off if its system of
torts spreads the costs of accidents broadly. Finally, according
to Priest, enterprise liability is closely linked to one specific
doctrinal principle, namely strict liability or liability without
fault.32 According to Priest, the reason for the marked shift
toward plaintiffs after 1960 is that American judges accepted
21 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 604.
28 Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 33 (K.B. 1744).
29 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 607.
30 Id. at 610-12.
31 Priest, supra note 2, at 527.
32 Id. at 462.
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the ideology of enterprise liability and implemented it by
expanding strict liability in American tort law.8"
As with all complex historical questions, both sides are
right in this debate. Clearly, Schwartz was correct when he
observed that the vast majority of doctrinal changes in the
torts revolution of the 1960s and '70s were merely extensions of
the fault principle, and that even products liability, after a
brief flirtation with true strict liability, settled back into a
version of the fault principle. But Priest was also correct in
that the principles of enterprise liability played a role in the
rise of the plaintiff after 1960. Both scholars are correct
because the expansion of the fault principle in favor of
plaintiffs was part of the legal realists' academic agenda, which
set the stage for the revolution of the 1960s. These legal
realists believed fervently in the theory of enterprise liability.
Scholars in 1930, when Leon Green, Fleming James and Harry
Shulman wrote, believed that the idea that the doctrines of
fault favoring defendants were arbitrary and formal and should
be expanded to allow more plaintiffs to win was consistent with
the idea that costs of accidents should be spread broadly. If, as
I noted above, one believed, as did the realists, that tort
principles were just instruments in the service of social
engineering, then there was nothing dishonest about using the
language of fault to create the right social outcome.
I want to stress, however, that the realist project, which
was most certainly progressive in spirit and pro-plaintiff in
effect, had a very different philosophical foundation than the
pro-plaintiff consensus described by Schwartz and, in the
context of today's "tort wars," defended today by most liberals.
The realists' project had two defining features: enterprise
liability and the elimination of fault. I discuss each in turn.
The idea that law should solve "social problems" was not
just a vague jurisprudential platitude to the realists when it
came to torts. It soon took on a very specific and precise
meaning. The work of Fleming James, the most outspoken and
persuasive realist advocate of enterprise liability, illustrates
this meaning. By the 1920s, the American experiment with
workman's compensation was well under way. What is
remarkable about the history of workman's compensation is
how many diverse parts of American society came together to
31 I take this to be Carl T. Bogus's central claim as well in WHY LAWSUITS
ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA (2001).
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support its adoption. This was in part because its rationale
could be viewed differently depending on one's social role. For
businesses, it seemed like a necessary way to cut off the
incipient expansion of the fault principle into the workplace.
For progressives, it seemed like the best way to get capitalists
to give back to workers some of the surplus value that the wage
system took from them. For James, it was simply an
illustration of the principle of risk distribution. That is, it was
always better "to divide a loss among a hundred individuals
than to put it on any one."34 This was because a single,
unpredictable, catastrophic loss to an individual costs far more
to society than the same loss distributed in small, predictable
payments." This was, of course, the theory of enterprise
liability.
James and other realists measured all tort rules against
the standard of enterprise liability. This usually led to pro-
plaintiff conclusions at the level of doctrine, since defendants
were generally in a better position to distribute risks." For
example, William 0. Douglas criticized Young B. Smith's
defense of the doctrine of vicarious liability, which argued that
entrepreneurs should be held liable for costs associated with
the actual control they have over their profit-making
ventures.37 Douglas was skeptical that there really was any
intelligible distinction between the control an enterprise had
over its workers and the control it had over independent
contractors. He argued instead for vicarious liability based on a
firm's size: The bigger the firm, the more able it would be to
spread the cost of the accident. 8
Sometimes the logic of enterprise liability brought the
realists to conclusions which seemed, at first blush, pro-
defendant. When Charles Gregory argued in favor of
contribution, he thought that he was promoting a progressive
reform in the face of nineteenth century conceptualism: From
the plaintiffs point of view, imposing the damage burden on
Priest, supra note 2, at 471 (paraphrasing Fleming James, Jr.,
Contribution Among Tort Feasors in the Field of Accident Litigation, 9 UTAH. B. BULL.
208 (1939)).
35 See Fleming James, Jr., Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors: A
Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1941).
36 Id. at 1169.
37 Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour (pts. I & II), 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444,
716 (1923).
William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (pts. I
& II), 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929).
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only one defendant worked against risk distribution.39 James
argued that Gregory's analysis was incomplete: The virtue of
the old system of several liability was that the victim usually
picked the largest and wealthiest of defendants to sue.
Contribution would allow that first defendant to spread some of
the cost onto a smaller and less solvent faulty party, thus
inhibiting the goal of enterprise liability. 4° Gregory later
admitted that James's logic was correct, and he noted that if
James's reasoning was extended, tort law should just be
replaced by "a program of socialization of loss through taxation
... [and] I would be most sympathetic." 1
One might think that a realist like James would have
been loath to support a doctrine that would have let small
enterprises off the hook if they were indeed responsible for
injuring people. But that assumes that James and the realists
viewed the world of torts through a simple capital versus labor
dichotomy. This may have been true of certain sociological
jurisprudes, like Brandeis, but by the late 1930s, any class
analysis that may have colored nineteenth century
progressivism was drained from the movement. For James, the
logic that argued for workman's compensation-which he found
irresistible-also argued for no-fault automobile insurance,
even though there was no obvious class orientation to the set of
defendants and plaintiffs in the typical road accident.42
Returning to James's critique of Gregory's argument for
contribution, one wonders why James did not view attributing
a cost to a faulty party as something that would always benefit
society in the end. According to Learned Hand, the purpose of
negligence law is to benefit society by making defendants pay
for their negligent conduct, where negligence means activities
whose cost of prevention is less than the expected loss.4" One
would think that James, whose interest seemed wholly focused
on social welfare, would have seen that allowing a large
enterprise to pay more than its expected loss, and small
" Charles 0. Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice,
1938 Wis. L. REV. 365, 373.
40 James, supra note 35, at 1165-66.
41 Charles 0. Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 1170 (1941).
42 See Fleming James, Jr. & Stuart C. Law, Compensation for Auto Accident
Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70 (1952) (detailing James's
thirty-year interest in this topic).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
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enterprises to get away by paying nothing, would defeat the
incentive structure of the Hand test. This is, of course, exactly
what a law and economics scholar would argue, and, like the
realists, law and economics is solely concerned with social
welfare.
One certainly should view James as a proto-realist. He
can be seen as the direct precursor to Guido Calabresi, a
foremost liberal law and economics scholar. But none of this
should obscure the one great point of departure between the
realists and modern law and economics: The realists were
skeptical of the idea that rules of tort law had anything to do
with the number of accidents in society. Law and economics
scholars premise their entire system on the power of law to
incentivize, and the application of the principles of negligence
is one of the means by which incentivization occurs.44 What law
and economics scholars fail to appreciate is that the realists
viewed incentivization as another conceptualist myth. To
understand why this is so, we must examine the second
defining feature of the realist project in torts: the rejection of
fault.
Beginning with Holmes's famous rejection of the
confusion of criminal and civil wrong in The Common Law,45
modern tort scholarship took for granted that when we talk
about "fault" in tort law, we mean a failure to achieve an
objective standard of conduct, not a subjective state of mind
that is evil or motivated by wrongful intent. However, those
who followed Holmes never adequately explained why a
negligent person (as opposed to the victim or a third party)
ought to pay for an accident. On a pragmatic level, many torts
scholars felt that there was no need to answer the question.
One could say, as many courts have, that as between two
innocents (the faulty defendant and the victim) the faulty party
who caused the harm should pay. Yet, as the realists pointed
out, this left too much up for grabs. How to define "fault"?
What if both parties were at fault? What about duty?
Proximate cause? How should these concepts be decided, if not
by reference to the defendant's decisions and choices? And so,
throughout the early part of the twentieth century and, in fact,
44 See generally WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L.
Meek et al. eds., 1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw (5th ed.
1998).
45 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1949).
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up to today, the content and character of the choices made by
the defendant remains a central question in a negligence case.
For the traditional corrective justice theorist, the
question of breach is twofold. The factfinder first asks, "did the
defendant act reasonably" and then, "could the defendant have
acted reasonably?" If the answer to the latter question is "no,"
then the answer to the former question is irrelevant. For the
modern law and economics theorist, the content of the choices
made by the defendant is just as important. From the
perspective of the Hand test, the question of breach is twofold.
The factfinder first asks, "did the defendant act efficiently" and
then, "would a finding of liability in a similar case have
incentivized the defendant to act efficiently?" If the answer to
the latter question is "no," then the answer to the former
question is irrelevant.
All of this assumes that, in general, the choices made by
the defendant are conscious choices that a self-conscious
deliberation could affect. The realists were skeptical of this
assumption. As James mentioned in his discussion of the "last
clear chance" rule, "[i]t is a wrong not to look for danger when
reasonable people would, even though failure to look springs
from a habit of inattentiveness which a psychologist might
regard as the inevitable outcome of heredity and
environment."46 This skepticism about the connection between
choice and fault formed the foundation of James's insistence on
cost spreading as the only scientific goal of tort law. In 1950,
James explicitly set out the empirical evidence which he
believed supported his viewpoint; he used studies by industrial
psychologists and the United States Army to support his view
that most accidents were the inevitable consequence of certain
persons being more "accident-prone" than others.47 James cited
one study that suggested that 10% of the workforce was
responsible for 75% of workplace accidents, and he cited
another that claimed that 4% of drivers were responsible for
33% of all auto accidents.48 From these and many other studies,
James concluded that although accident-proneness is not
randomly distributed throughout the population, its presence
in certain persons is not attributable to any self-conscious
46 Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE
L.J. 704, 714 (1938).
47 Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 HARv. L. REV. 769 (1950).
48 Id. at 770.
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mental state. Absent "from the causes of accident-proneness
are 'carelessness' or 'fault' . . . 'accident proneness may be a...
phenomenon independent of any question of responsibility,
conscious action or blameworthiness.
If it were true that people who caused accidents were
not consciously responsible for their actions, what should the
tort system do? James advised (as would Calabresi twenty
years later) that there were two choices: (1) take measures that
reduce the number of accidents caused by the accident-prone;
or (2) take measures that minimize the bad effects of the
accidents that do happen.0 James briefly considered the idea of
the government segregating the accident-prone from society,
but, as he noted, the "accident-prone-about four percent of the
total population-can scarcely be kept out of work and off the
roads."' On the other hand, steps obviously could be taken by
the individual or her employer to minimize the degree to which
the accident-prone individual imposes risks on others. But
James thought it obvious that the individual was in a terrible
position to regulate her own conduct. Not only is it
psychologically impossible for the individual to decrease the
risks she imposes on others by self-conscious effort, but the
types of decisions which could make a difference-about rates
of activity, for example-are precisely the sorts of decisions
which only large institutions are good at making."
This meant, of course, that if one wanted to use tort law
to minimize the risks posed by the accident-prone, litigation
focusing on the choices made by faulty individual defendants
would be ineffectual, because it "emphasize[s] the relatively
insignificant part which the individual's conscious free choice
plays in causing or preventing accidents." 3 Instead, asking
large organizations, like corporations and insurers, to make
those determinations was far more rational. 4 And finally, given
49 Id. at 775 (citation omitted).
50 Id. at 777.
1 Id. at 776.
52 James & Dickinson, supra note 47, at 780.
53 Id.
Large organizations could reduce overall costs if they could (1) remove the
individual actor from a dangerous position; (2) train the actor to act safely despite his
or her accident-proneness; or (3) construct prophylactics so that when the individual
acted unsafely (an inevitable event) their injury was ameliorated. Of these three
options, industrial America was especially keen on (2) and (3). See John Fabian Witt,
Speedy Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 (2003)
(describing the work of "safety engineers" on behalf of large corporations who wished to
reduce their workman compensation costs after 1910).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
that accidents were mostly inevitable and were not the result of
conscious ill will, the cost of trying to deter them would be at
some point much higher than allowing them to occur and
spreading their costs. Thus, if accident-proneness was a
medical or psychological condition (and not even necessarily a
disease), the appropriate response was enterprise liability, not
fault-based deterrence or corrective justice.
James's argument against fault was clearly rooted in
the new science of behavioralism, which was in vogue in the
middle of the twentieth century. But other realists had their
own reasons for being skeptical of fault. Albert Ehrenzweig saw
fault as an expression of a repressed social desire to impose
order onto the world, in much the same way that Freud
understood certain psychoanalytic-desires categories that,
although repressed, govern action subconsciously." Ehrenzweig
noted that, even though tort law claimed to have abandoned
the idea that fault reflected moral defect, there remained, even
in the conception of "objective" fault, "a primitive urge to find a
wish and a will behind all causation."" Although we agree that
a faulty actor might not have been able to act differently, we
"single him out . . . [because] we refuse to believe in the
harmdoer's innocence, and that negligence, however objectively
conceived, implies blame for subconscious fault."57
Ehrenzweig anticipated Schwartz's observation that
American tort law, because of the pressure exerted on it by
various progressive forces, would provide greater and greater
recovery to plaintiffs through an expanded menu of claims
under the fault principle. What intrigued Ehrenzweig was that
the American tort system clung to the fault principle despite its
contradictions and suspect conceptualist roots. He cited
James's article on accident-proneness and said that no one
could possibly believe that the reason the fault rule is retained
in automobile cases is for deterrence." Ehrenzweig could not
see how the fault principle, through deterrence, could possibly
produce safer products under the emerging doctrine of products
liability." In the end, Ehrenzweig argued, deterrence and
reformation were mere rationalizations designed to dress up
" See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U. L.
REV. 855 (1953).
Id. at 861.
57Id. at 862.
Id. at 865.
59 Id.
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the fault principle so that it would fit into the scientific modes
of discourse that characterized social science in the twentieth
century. The real mystery, from a socio-psychological point of
view, was the persistence of the fault principle, since it seemed
obvious to Ehrenzweig that the fault principle was simply a
"more refined form of retaliation" rooted in the early "barbaric
system of revenge" that Holmes claimed had been left behind
with the adoption of the objective system of negligence."
Ehrenzweig was no more impressed by strict liability
than by the fault principle. Strict liability merely pushed the
question of revenge back to the step of causation. All strict
liability says is that "the person innocently causing the harm is
'less innocent' than the injured;" strict liability projects onto
innocent conduct a ground for liability.61 Thus, the selection of
an innocent causal actor under strict liability is no different
from the selection of a faulty but well-intentioned actor under
the objective test for negligence. In both cases, what is doing
the legal work is really the subconscious "animism which sees
fault in all causation."62 Thus, Ehrenzweig observed that in the
end, fault is "the mother of all absolute liability statutes."63 For
Ehrenzweig, the only "mature" response to accident would be
some form of social or loss insurance.64 In making this claim, he
was, of course, explicitly and half-seriously comparing modern
America's "choice" of the fault system to the sorts of immature
and self-defeating choices that an immature or untherapized
adult might make in his personal life. Ehrenzweig noted that
where experts had recommended no-fault programs, society (or
influential elements in society) resisted: The Saskatchewan no-
fault auto insurance program was undercut by the retention of
a right to recover for injuries caused by negligence-thus
forcing the insurance scheme to retain "the most irrational
feature of our law.,
65
In 1959, Fleming James delivered a lecture at the
University of Buffalo School of Law in which he looked back at
tort law in the middle of the twentieth century.66 According to
60 Ehrenzweig, supra note 55, at 866.
61 Id. at 870.
62 Id.
63 Id. (citations omitted).
64 Id.
65 Ehrenzweig, supra note 55, at 871 (citing Leon Green, The Automobile
Accident Insurance Act of Saskatchewan, 32 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 39 (1950)).
6" Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial
Process, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315 (1959).
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the accepted histories of tort law, this speech occurred just
before the beginning of the "revolution" in torts. The tone of the
lecture is slightly depressed. James noted that, given the forty
years of empirical studies on the question of the incidence and
cost of accidents in society, he could easily state a number of
conclusions. First, most victims of accidents were
undercompensated for their economic losses." Second, there
was a tremendous randomness in the amount of compensation
that victims of similar accidents received. 8 Third, many people
had no first party insurance, and the people who needed it the
most (the working poor) had it the least. 9 Fourth, most tort
damages were paid not by the party found in fault, but by
either an insurer or an employer."9 Fifth, since most accidents
were caused by accident-prone persons who were ignorant that
they were accident-prone, and who would not be able to do
anything about it if they knew, "putting the pressure of tort
liability directly on individuals" was futile.7 Sixth, programs
like workman's compensation had led to a reduction in
industrial accident rates.
From this James concluded: "[T]he present system is a
miserable failure, marked by stark overall inadequacy
punctuated by occasional fantastically high awards."7' He
suggested that one day America might get around to adopting a
system of social insurance based on the principles of enterprise
liability. And in the meantime? In a section titled The Role of
Courts in the Meantime, James listed the things that he
thought progressive torts scholars like himself should
encourage as satisfactory intermediate steps.74
The first idea James endorsed was that the courts adopt
a laundry list of pro-plaintiff doctrinal changes. These included:
eliminating intra-family and charitable immunities; allowing
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress; expanding
products liability; eliminating the special limitations of liability
for landowners; abolishing or reducing contributory negligence;
expanding res ipsa loquitur; and further developing the
67 Id. at 328-29.
68 Id. at 329.
69 Id. at 329-30.
76 Id. at 330.
71 James, supra note 66, at 330.
72 Id. at 331.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 335-37.
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substantial factor test in causation. 5 Of course, this "wish list"
contained virtually all of the doctrinal changes that
materialized after 1960. What is odd, of course, is that James
should have endorsed these moves as part of his realist agenda.
As noted above, according to Schwartz, these doctrinal changes
were part of the expansion of the fault principle, not its
elimination.
The reason for James's apparent change of heart is easy
to see-as a realist, he had no trouble recommending doctrinal
changes that would make the tort system look more like a
social insurance system, even if the conceptual foundations for
those changes were quite different from his own. James did not
actually believe in the fault principle, or even in deterrence. 'He
would not, however, oppose the adoption of a doctrine just
because its champion believed in that doctrine because it was a
perfection of the fault principle (or would achieve deterrence).
For James, half a loaf was better than none.
For the remainder of this Article, I describe what has
happened since the realists helped us achieve their half a loaf.
It is possible that James and Ehrenzweig thought that after
tort law expanded to include more participants within the fault
system and allowed more recoveries through the litigation
process, their real agenda would gradually take hold, and
America would replace the negligence system with a system of
social insurance. Perhaps they thought that, at the very least,
some form of strict liability would replace negligence, so that
the problems identified by the realists with the concept of fault
would be gradually removed from our law and thrown into the
dustbin of tort history, along with other embarrassing concepts
like the wergeld 6 But nothing like that has occurred. I argue
that not only has negligence remained vital to our tort system,
but, in fact, fault is being "remoralized"-that is to say, more
and more tort litigation is using a concept of fault that asks the
factfinder to focus on the defendant's subjective state of mind.
A very interesting episode in the history of American
tort law illustrates my argument. The realists were, as I
described above, absolutely certain that, after workman's
compensation, automobile accidents would be the next part of
American tort law to fall to the logic of enterprise liability.
" Id. at 336.
76 In ancient Germanic and Anglo-Saxon law, wergeld was a person's value in
monetary terms, which was paid by a person committing an offense to the injured
party or, in the case of death, to his family.
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James was certain that automobile litigation exhibited all the
characteristics of an excellent candidate for treatment under a
no-fault system. In 1970, Massachusetts enacted the first no-
fault automobile insurance law,77 and about half the states in
the country followed suit within a few years.78 No-fault had
been the sort of "good-government" issue that many liberals
supported. They saw it as part of a progressive, regulatory
response to an expensive, inequitable and inefficient system.
Not surprisingly, Consumer's Union-probably the leading
consumer's rights group in the country at the time-supported
no-fault.7 ' The basic argument for no-fault was that it helped
low-income drivers by insuring that they received a minimum
of guaranteed coverage for economic losses with no litigation in
exchange for limits on non-economic damages.
Beginning in the 1980s, no-fault regimes around the
country came under attack. The primary complaint was that
they had not achieved real reductions in auto insurance costs,
although the reasons for that are somewhat complex.8" What is
more interesting for purposes of this Article is the fact that
some of the strongest critics of no-fault today are consumer
groups such as Public Citizen and Consumer's Union. In the
midst of the somewhat arcane debate over whether any state
has really tried a "pure" no-fault scheme (compared to
"modified no-fault" which allows litigation once low thresholds
are met), one cannot but be amused by Ralph Nader's
comments in 1999:
No-fault systems explicitly contradict the fundamental principle of
American justice that wrongdoers are held responsible for the harm
they cause. By eliminating "fault," no-fault effectively treats good
drivers and bad drivers the same. This is not merely a philosophical
77 A young Michael Dukakis, who had recently been elected to the state
legislature, championed no-fault in Massachusetts.
71 See Auto Choice Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1860 Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 112-19 (1996) (statement of
Mr. Andrew Tobias, insurance reform advocate).
79 In 1971, 1973 and 1984, Consumer's Union strongly endorsed no-fault in
editorials in its magazine Consumer Reports.
8' A common criticism of no-fault regimes was that many state legislatures
did not adopt true no-fault, but weak hybrids compromised by add-ons or monetary
thresholds. In the add-on states there are very few or no restrictions on lawsuits, and
typically some plaintiffs recover economic damages in the form of no-fault payments
and then use the tort system to sue for pain and suffering. In the monetary threshold
states, a plaintiff who incurs medical costs above the threshold preserves his right to
bring a lawsuit. These thresholds, although varied but most often being low in the
dollar level, create an incentive to incur higher medical costs.
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concern. A body of evidence shows that no-fault leads to more
accidents because it weakens the deterrent effect of the tort law.8'
Nader may be right; maybe James was completely wrong about
no-fault insurance, fault, deterrence and accident-proneness.
What is incredible to note, however, is how far "progressive"
tort law has come since the 1930s. Obviously, at least when it
comes to automobile accidents, the consumer movement has
very little in common with the philosophical foundations of the
realists.
It is no secret that the Naderite organization, Public
Citizen, today opposes any effort to move to non-tort
compensation schemes. There are cynical explanations for this
position, but I do not want to pursue them. Rather, let us take
Nader at his word: It is a fundamental principle worth
upholding that faulty actors should pay for the injuries they
cause. What would be the philosophical foundation that would
underpin this new "progressive" view of fault?
One place to gain insight into this worldview is a new
book, In Defense of Tort Law, written by two self-identified pro-
consumer torts scholars, Thomas H. Koenig and Michael L.
Rustad. The book begins with a quote from Prosser: "[Tihe law
of torts is a battleground of social theory."82 At the beginning of
the book, they tell with admirable clarity the history described
above. They add an additional historical epoch, which they
describe as "Tort Law Retraction: 1981-Present." This makes
sense, since as Schwartz noted in the title of his 1992 history of
modern tort law, 3 by the 1980s the pro-plaintiff explosion in
tort doctrine had come to a standstill and might even have
begun to reverse. The rest of the book's six chapters are a
guided tour of the current doctrinal areas which Koenig and
Rustad think are noteworthy, either because they are emerging
areas of tort law or because they are under siege from the
forces of "tort reform." Therefore, although titled a "defense" of
tort law, the book does not claim to be a comprehensive defense
of all of tort law. One must assume that Koenig and Rustad
thought that some parts of the doctrine are so uncontroversial
as to require no defense.
8' Public Citizen Congress Watch, What People Are Saying About "Choice" No
Fault, available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/nofault/articles.cfm?ID=862
(last visited Apr. 4, 2003) (quoting testimony by Ralph Nader given to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation).
82 RUSTAD & KOENIG, supra note 1, at 1.
See Schwartz, supra note 3.
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Yet, there is something very peculiar about the world of
torts described in the book. When Koenig and Rustad discuss
medical malpractice, they discuss medical malpractice so
heinous that it looks like battery, 4 and when they discuss
products liability, they' discuss conspiracies on the part of
manufacturers to conceal and deceive."5 Of course, as Rustad
and Koenig know, as an empirical matter, only a tiny fraction
of torts involve conduct which warrants punitive damages." In
reality, modern tort law in America is about car accidents:
About two-thirds of all claims, three-quarters of all lawyers'
fees and three-quarters of all payouts in the personal injury
liability system arise from auto accident cases. Punitive
damages are very rarely awarded in car accident cases for the
obvious reason that Americans, litigious as they are, do not
claim that the person who struck them was anything more
than careless.8 The remaining one-third of claims, those
arising from non-automobile related injuries, are usually the
result of mere accident.
Rustad and Koenig's highly unrepresentative review of
"modern" tort law reflects their interpretive standpoint. The
reason they highlight such rare and unusual cases is that cases
involving highly culpable conduct (as opposed to mere
negligence) represent the true core function of modern tort law.
In their book's conclusion, Koenig and Rustad describe the
"most important function" of tort law as "compensating for
wrongs that are rarely [but could be] punished through
criminal law."8 Criminal activity is an odd place to begin
describing the basic or most important function of tort law.
Holmes rejected subjective standards of liability in negligence
cases, in part because he believed that in the modern world
there was and ought to be a great difference between tort law
and criminal law. Needless to say, the realists would have
found this characterization of tort law strange. James thought
that tortfeasors suffered from something akin to an illness. So
84 RUSTAD & KOENIG, supra note 1, at 137-38. The cases discussed in these
pages are, in fact, clear cases of battery.
85 Id. at 180-81.
86 Id. at 39.
87 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 120-21 (1991).
'8 Nonetheless, Americans are likely to blame car accidents on someone else:
A Rand Institute study discovered that 90% of drivers in two car accidents blamed
someone else for the crash. See id. at 159.
89 Id. at 207.
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well was the modern legal academy schooled in the teachings of
Holmes that Ehrenzweig thought that the desire to punish,
while at the root of modern tort law, was something with which
any self-respecting torts scholar would vehemently deny any
connection. To put it bluntly, Koenig and Rustad's claim is not
merely nonobvious, it contradicts the dominant tradition of
modern tort theory.
Political scientists offer two explanations for the
resurgence of blame in tort law. One explanation is that
reversion to the tort system has proven to be a relatively
successful strategy for political actors interested in changing
the status quo, because American political institutions are so
diffuse and difficult to control. According to this "constitutional
theory," decentralization combined with a post-war demand for
"governmental activism on social problems" channels to the
courts energy that would otherwise go toward other democratic
institutions. ° Three features of the courts make them a
relatively more attractive site for activism in the United States.
First, courts are independent of the state apparatuses (the
"insulation incentive"); second, they are powerful (the "control
incentive"); and third, they do not have to raise funds to
achieve the ends which they command-instead they force the
losers of the adjudged lawsuits to implement their will, on pain
of being found in contempt of court (the "cost-shifting
incentive").91
According to the constitutional theory, it is no accident
that Ralph Nader perceives a coincidence between his interest
in redistribution and the admittedly inefficient private tort
system. Unlike the realists in the 1920s and '30s and
progressive social democrats in Europe, Nader has a visceral
distrust of government bureaucracies. He believes that
government agencies are subject to capture and fall prey to the
same cost-benefit reasoning that corporations use.92 On the
other hand, "for everything wrong with bureaucracies, Nader
sees something right with courts."93 Since courts are not part of
a centralized and rationalized structure, they can be reached
'0 See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 13 (2002)
(citing Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. PUB.
POL'Y & MGMT. 369 (1991)); Robert A. Kagan, Trying to Have It Both Ways: Local
Discretion, Central Control, and Adversarial Legalism in American Environmental
Regulation, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 718 (1999).
91 BURKE, supra note 90, at 15.
9' Id. at 53-54.
9' Id. at 54.
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and persuaded by mavericks with new and unconventional
points of view (e.g., people like Nader). Of course, one might
argue that rationally organized, bureaucratic approaches to the
questions of social policy are more likely to actually help the
poor than are "maverick" appeals to isolated courts-that is, of
course, the lesson of success of the Weberian tradition in
Europe.94  Sometimes the tradeoff between the Naderite
program-driven as it is by the insulation, control and cost-
shifting incentives-and the interests of those it wants to help
is quite palpable. For example, in Lawyers, Lawsuits, and
Legal Rights Thomas Burke details how Nader and his allies in
the California Democratic Party fought a coalition of Latino
and poverty activists who wanted to push a low-cost, no-fault
program through the California legislature in 1988. 9'
The constitutional theory is attractive, but it can only
tell half the story. There would be no point to the structural
incentives offered by the courts if the substantive decisions
made in the courts were not of interest to the groups who were
in a position to choose the venue where, all things being equal,
they wanted the question of the cost of accidents to be heard. If,
for example, judges and juries were indifferent to the rhetoric
of blame, or worse yet, were more likely to blame plaintiffs as
opposed to defendants for their injuries, then there would be no
reason to believe that courts would be a more attractive venue
than legislatures and agencies for those interested in
redistributing the costs of accidents.
This is where the second theory from political science,
which attempts to explain the rise of litigiousness in America,
helps to clarify matters. According to Daniel Polisar and Aaron
Wildavsky, American political culture has always been a
product of the interplay (or tension) between individualism and
egalitarianism." Both ends of this spectrum place blame at the
center of their political worldview: Individualists explain
accidents by looking at the fault of individuals, while
9' See, e.g., STEVEN KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY (1981).
'5 BURKE, supra note 90, at 120-41. For a less restrained and much more
bitter account of Nader's role in thwarting no-fault in California, see Andrew Tobias,
Ralph Nader is a Big Fat Idiot, WORTH, Oct. 1996, at 94.
96 Daniel Polisar & Aaron Wildavsky, From Individual to System Blame: A
Cultural Analysis of Historical Change in the Law of Torts, 1 J. POL'Y HIST. 133, 143-44
(1989). Individualism and egalitarianism form two cells of a four-cell matrix. The other
two cells are fatalism and hierarchy. An example of a society suspended in tension
between egalitarianism and hierarchy is a social democracy such as Sweden.
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egalitarians explain accidents by blaming "the system."97 When
egalitarians blame "the system," they do so by viewing its
symbols-experts, corporations, municipalities, etc.-as filled
with the potential for wrongdoing which is made manifest
whenever there is an accident.98
The theory of system blame is a little misleading, since
it is not really about a shift of blame away from individuals to
society. In fact, ironically, true system blame would not have
much use for a tort system. If egalitarians truly believed that
"the system" were at fault for the injuries suffered by
consumers, auto drivers, workers and patients, then they
would probably want to scrap individual litigation designed to
identify defendant fault and support government-sponsored
insurance schemes and no-fault. True system blame would lead
an egalitarian to exactly the same position as that adopted by
the realists seventy years ago.
The insight motivating Polisar and Wildavsky's concept
of "system blame" is that blame is a shared point of orientation
around which American political culture, in its different
modalities, revolves. This is consistent with Kagan and Burke's
analysis of the three incentives that drive political actors
toward the courts under the conditions of weak government in
their constitutional theory.99 Courts, not agencies, are sites
where the language of blame is readily heard. System blame is
really nothing more than the relative intensification of the
number of occasions when society will deem certain actions as
potentially blameworthy, and a shift in the identity of the
actors. Under the regime of what Polisar and Wildavsky call
individual blame, relatively more accidents were presumed or
adjudged to be either the victim's or no one's fault, while in the
period of system blame, relatively more accidents are presumed
or adjudged to be the fault of someone with whom the victim
had some sort of relationship.' 0
Under this interpretation, there is no a priori reason to
presume that the episodes of blaming in law that characterize
the constitutional theory and the theory of system blame will
go necessarily against capital and achieve redistribution.
"7 Id. at 144.
9s Somewhat hyperbolically, Polisar and Wildavsky characterize the effect of
the shift from individualism to egalitarianism on American tort law thusly: "Fault once
had to be proved; now it is presumed." Id. at 146.
99 See BURKE, supra note 90, at 13-15.
1o Polisar & Wildavsky, supra note 96, at 148.
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Indeed, as America's experience with no-fault auto insurance
has demonstrated, activists who want to use the tort system to
promote redistribution will vigorously defend a regime of
blaming through litigation, even when it clearly hurts the poor.
One might view the tactical adoption of blame structures as
part of a progressive strategy of the second best. That is, if the
constitutional theory is correct, then given the embedded
separation of powers at the very core of government, private
litigation is the best that the poor could ever hope to get,
notwithstanding the claims of academics to the contrary.
Another explanation for the postwar embrace of blaming
structures by progressives is that American progressivism, like
American political culture, is itself deeply affected by the
individualism/egalitarianism split identified by Polisar and
Wildavsky. That is to say, progressive thought in the United
States simply may not be as concerned with economic justice as
it was in the earlier parts of this century. To be sure, Polisar
and Wildavsky assume that they must solve the problem of
why the growing influence of egalitarianism produced the
phenomenon they identify as system blame. But consider, if
just for a moment, whether progressive political culture
became more concerned with identifying and punishing the
wrongs of individuals than with improving the average utility
functions of society since the era of legal realism. Burke
observes, almost as an aside, that although he is skeptical that
American political culture is characterized by an increase in
"rights talk" (as argued by Mary Ann Glendon in 1991), he is
much more persuaded that what followers of Glendon are
really seeing is an increase in "punishment talk" in American
political discourse. '
Burke does not pursue his point, partly because his
constitutional theory is supposed to explain the rise of
litigation without reference to political culture, and partly (I
suspect) because he associates Glendon's work with a certain
kind of political conservatism, which would be hard to square
with the pro-litigation actors whose decisions he has tried to
explain in his book. Nonetheless, I think that Burke may be on
to something. As he notes, punishment talk was doing a lot of
work in the Naderite campaign against no-fault auto insurance
in California: "[T]he campaign consultant who successfully beat
back Proposition 104 ... found that voters responded less to a
'0' BURKE, supra note 90, at 184.
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rights argument than to a punishment argument-that bad
drivers should pay the price for their mistakes."' ° I suspect
that the argument that would work best to convince citizens to
keep other unwieldy parts of our tort system-such as medical
malpractice or products liability-is not that victims have a
right to the sometimes oversized awards they receive, but that
a system which provides for punishment is better than one
which distributes wealth evenly but bloodlessly.
To conclude, I recommend that scholars engage in
further study on the present attraction of punishment to
progressive torts scholars and activists. This may seem like a
strange research agenda to recommend, given the important
role that progressives play today in opposing America's
Draconian criminal justice system. Nonetheless, we may find
that, ironically, realism's assault on the philosophical and
psychological assumptions behind the concept of fault has been
set aside by realism's heirs to pursue-perhaps with
justification-an agenda in which punishment, and hence
blame, provide the clarion call of progressive torts.
'0' Id. at 184.

